MeshCore Encryption Overview

This page summarizes MeshCore's encryption as verified from the official source code. The key facts: AES-128 symmetric encryption, ECDH key exchange using Ed25519 keys transposed to X25519, and a 2-byte truncated MAC (derived from HMAC-SHA256) for message authentication.

Verified Encryption Summary

Security Caveats

• ECB mode leaks structure: ECB encrypts each 16-byte block independently, so identical plaintext blocks produce identical ciphertext blocks. A passive listener can detect repeated content, message patterns, and known headers without the key. Do not assume ECB hides patterns in templated or repetitive traffic. (MeshCore embeds a timestamp in each message to partially mitigate this.)
• The 2-byte (16-bit) MAC is weak: A truncated 16-bit MAC is an integrity check, not strong authentication. An active attacker can forge it by brute force in roughly 32,000 attempts. Channel "authentication" is also group-level only: any holder of the channel key can forge messages as any sender.
• No forward secrecy: Identity keys are static, so a single leaked private key decrypts all past and future recorded traffic for that node. There is no key revocation.
• The public/default channel key is publicly documented (8b3387e9c5cdea6ac9e5edbaa115cd72). Traffic on the public channel is readable by anyone; it is not private or secure against observers.

Common Misconceptions

• Not AES-256: MeshCore uses AES-128, not AES-256. Key length (128-bit) is adequate; the real cryptographic limitations of MeshCore are the ECB cipher mode and the 2-byte (16-bit) truncated MAC described in the Security Caveats above — not the key size.
• Not CTR mode: The implementation uses ECB mode with zero-padding, not CTR or GCM mode.
• The official MeshCore website states "AES-128 encryption" - this matches the source code.

Source: Official MeshCore repository source code. Verified 2026-05-03.